Chinese President Xi Jinping opened the 2026 World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) and High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance in Shanghai by casting Beijing as champion of a “new global AI order”. His keynote tied China’s domestic regulatory experience to a broader push for open-source AI, shared standards and capacity-building for developing countries. He positioned AI as an “international public good” rather than a strategic asset reserved for major powers.
China moves to institutionalise global AI governance
The WAIC and high-level governance meeting run from 17 to 20 July in Shanghai. They bring together more than 1,400 international guests across over 140 themed forums, according to official conference information. The event is now in its eighth year and has become China’s flagship AI policy and industry forum.
Xi used the opening ceremony to promote open-source AI models. He warned against “new historical injustices” caused by unequal access to the technology. He pledged Chinese support to help developing countries build AI capabilities, explicitly linking AI access to development outcomes and global competitiveness. That line aligns with Beijing’s recent white paper on “More Just and Equitable Global Governance”, which presents China’s Global AI Governance Initiative as a people-centred, development-oriented framework.
China’s message is consistent: it backs the United Nations as the main channel for international AI rule-making, supports UN resolutions on AI capacity building, and wants AI governance anchored in multilateral, development-focused institutions. At WAIC, China also released an action plan on international AI ethics governance, framed within the UN Pact for the Future and the Global Digital Compact. The plan calls for lifecycle ethical oversight, tiered risk control, and inclusive governance capacity-building, with a specific focus on cooperation with developing countries.
For investors, the signal is clear. China intends to be a rule-maker, not just a rule-taker, in areas such as AI safety standards, open-source model governance, and cross-border data and model flows. As China’s domestic rules on generative AI, algorithmic recommendations and content labelling mature, they are now being put forward as reference points for emerging international norms.
World AI Cooperation Organization: a new multilateral venue
The most concrete institutional proposal around WAIC is the planned World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO). Chinese officials are promoting it as an open, development-focused multilateral body for AI. Preparatory work accelerated in the first half of 2026, with headquarters tentatively planned for Shanghai and a founding agreement signed on the sidelines of the conference.
Analysts from Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy describe WAICO as distinct from existing forums. Its membership is open to any sovereign state, it avoids ideological entry tests, and it focuses on development and bridging the AI capability gap in the Global South. Its guiding principles include AI “for good and for the people”, safety and controllability, fairness and inclusivity, and open cooperation.
Operationally, WAICO is envisaged to support AI capacity-building programmes in developing countries. It aims to promote open-source technology sharing and explainability, privacy and bias-mitigation tools. It will also work towards aligning development strategies, governance rules and technical standards to build a globally recognised AI governance framework.
For many Global South representatives in Shanghai, Xi’s emphasis on narrowing the digital and AI divide has clear appeal. Officials from Laos and Zambia, among others, welcomed the focus on shared development benefits and the notion of AI as a tool to tackle common challenges, rather than a wedge in strategic competition.
For institutional investors and corporates, WAICO could become an influential venue for shaping interoperability standards, certification regimes and best-practice guidance for AI deployment across emerging markets. China’s stated intention to “vigorously develop an open-source ecosystem” and “abandon closed, exclusive and technologically monopolistic development models” suggests a more flexible approach to cross-border collaboration than some expect.
However, Western frameworks still dominate many high-value markets, and no single global regime is close to binding treaty status. The current environment remains a patchwork of national rules, regional regulations and voluntary commitments. China’s proposals add another centre of gravity rather than replacing existing ones.
As WAIC closes and WAICO moves from concept to structure, investors should watch three signals: how far China’s ethics action plan influences domestic and cross-border regulation; whether WAICO attracts broad membership beyond close partners; and how open-source AI collaboration is translated into concrete cross-border projects and standards that affect market access, compliance costs and partnership opportunities.
